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REVISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER:
A STUDY OF VARIO US APPROACHES

Richard F. Scott*

I. The Problem De-fined
the United Nations Charter has survived rigorous tests
.L""l- of practice and application, all will doubtless agree that it should
now undergo careful review if not thorough revision. Review in
moderate terms is a matter of continuous international process, the
Charter's structures and rules being regularly applied to the situations of everyday international life. As the necessary precondition
to revision, however, the Charter will be subjected to a more deliberate, systematic, and searching review before concrete proposals
for revision reach a competent international authority. Thus review
is at once exploratory and promising. But revision is much more.
Charter revision suggests a host of problems combining political
and legal elements. Here the political aspects may not be entirely
distilled from the legal for purposes of study in terms of political
doctrine and technique. Nor do the legal aspects of revision problems separate themselves for lawyerlike analysis. Law interweaves
with politics to confront lawyer and policymaker alike with mixed
problems of technique in the sphere of international operations. Probably the larger problem is one of change and accommodation following
from the expectation that the law should register more precisely the
recognized changes in international life since the Charter's adoption.
A widened sense of world community may permit or even demand
a broader concept of regulation. Or divisive forces at work since the
inception of the United Nations may seek reflection in a narrower,
more contracted sphere for international control of politics through
formal organization. In either case, proposals to modify the Charter
center upon a notion of changing law, in this instance the basic law
of the world community. Put thus in its proper context, Charter
revision becomes more simply a problem of legal change. It would
accordingly seem to presuppose a critical reexamination of alternative legal techniques made available by international law for the purpose of effecting changes in existing international legal relations.
Assuming prior political determination of the substantive matters
to be modified, and given the existence of a range of available tech,\_LTHOUGH
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niques, the ultimate choice of legal technique is conditioned by a
number of political factors. In particular, any proposal emanating
from the United States will be significantly affected by domestic politics and public opinion. International politics may likewise control
the ultimate results of the revision process. The use of particular
legal devices, independent of substantive proposals, may carry prohibitive, or at least conditioning, political implications. The Charter
revisionist thus confronts a complicated problem. He must decide
upon substantive changes, and choose devices which may effectuate
the desired change. He must then find general domestic and international support for those changes, and select a legally permissible
instrumentality with political implications consistent with over-all international goals.
If these are proper or practical limitations on the process of Charter revision, then the extreme approaches to revision may be excluded
at the outset. One extreme position proposes that the United States
minimize the sphere of international obligation and maximize the
area of political free-play by renouncing the Charter entirely.1 To
this end, proponents of renunciation could rely upon the familiar
doctrines of rebus sic stantibus,2 prior breach,8 and the alleged right
1 At various times resolutions calling for withdrawal from the United Nations or
rescission of the Charter are proposed to the Congress. Some are conditional upon the
organization failing to follow a given policy. H.J. Res. 463, 82d Cong., 2d sess. (1952);
S.J. Res. 14, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951); H.J. Res. 239, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951).
Others are unconditional and absolute. H. Con. Res. 3, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953); H.R.
105, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953); H.R. 5080, H.R. 5081, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951);
H. Con. Res. 166, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951).
2 See THB FREE ZoNEs oP UPPER SAVOY AND nm DxsTRicr OP Gnx, P.C.I.J.; Ser.
NB, No. 46, at 96, 158; 2 HUDSON, WoRLD Cotm'I' REPORTS 448, 555 (1932); Opinion
on the International Load Line Convention, 40 OP. ATTY. GEN. 119 (1941). International practice bearing on the doctrine rebus sic stantibus is collected in Harvard Draft
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. IN-r. L. SUPP. 655 at 1096 (1935); 5
fuCKwoRTH, DxcnsT OP lNrBRNATIONAL LAw §511, p. 349 (1943); 5 MooRE, DxcBS'l'
OP lNrBRNATIONAL LAw §772 (1908); Hill, "The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus in
International Law," UNIV. oP Mxssoum STaoms, IX, No. 3 (193~); McNAIR, THB I.Aw
oP TRBATms 376 (1938); 2 HYDE, lNrBBNATIONAL LAw CHIEFLY AS lNrBRPRETED AND
APPLil!D BY nm UNITED STATES, 2d ed., pp. 1523-1541 (1945). For a recent controversy
see Briggs; "Rebus Sic Stantibus before the Security Council: the Anglo-Egyptian Question," 43 AM. J. IN-r. L. 762 (1949). Included in the Economic :Aid Agreement with
Spain is an express clause adopting rebus sic stantibus for that agreeement. See Article
X(2) of the Economic Aid Agreement, Agreements Concluded with Spain, 29 DEP'l'. op
S'I'ATE BuL. 435, 436, 439 (1953).
3 See Harvard Draft Convention on Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. IN-r. L. SUPP. 655 at
1077-1096 (1935), for a collection of the practice and authorities. Article 27(a) of the
Draft, provides: "If a state fails to carry out in good faith its obligations under a treaty,
any other party to the treaty, acting in a reasonable time after the failure, may seek from a
competent international tribunal or authority a declaration to the effect that the treaty has
ceased to be binding upon it in the sense of calling for further performance with respect
to such state." Soviet violations of the Charter are cliscussed in Acheson, "Progress Toward
International Peace and Unity," 26 DEP'l', oP STATE Bm.. 647 (1952); Acheson, "The
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of unilateral withdrawal from international organizations.4 But even
if the law of nations permits application of these principles against
the Charter;' legal considerations in this area would doubtless yield
to the overwhelming impact of political implications. Neither American0 nor international opinion generally7 presently supports renunciation of the Charter, and renunciation would lead only to a general
Peace the World Wants," 23 DEPT. OP STATE BuL, 523 (1950); Austin, "The Problem
of Voting in the Security Council," 20 DEPT. OP STATE BuL. 512 (1949). The prolonged
absence of the USSR from the United Nations organs during 1950 can be construed as a
violation of art. 28(1). See Austin, ''Review of Security Council Action in Defense of
Korea," 23 DEPT. OF STATE BUL. 451 (1950). Other Soviet violations associated with the
Korea action are discussed in SEctllllTY CotJNCIL OFFICIAL REcoRDs, 5th Year, No. 37
at 5 (1950). The effect of the violations for prior breach purposes, however, is vitiated
by Charter remedies. See articles 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 39; GoonruCH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER
OP nm UNITED NATIONS, 2d ed., 138, 140 (1949); KELsEN, THE LAw OP nm UNITED
NATIONS 712, 714, 732 (1950).
4 With respect to the right of withdrawal, Committee I/2 of the San Francisco
Conference used the following language: "If ••. a Member because of exceptional circumstances feels constrained to withdraw, and leave the burden of maintaining international
peace and security on the other Members, it is not the purpose of the Organization to compel that Member to continue its cooperation in the Organization." Report of Rapporteur
of Committee I/2, as amended, 7 U.N. CoNP. Doc. 324 at 328 (1945). This report was
approved in plenary session of the Conference, 1 U.N. CoNP. Doc. 620 (1945). For a
view that this action of the Conference was of no legal significance see KELsEN, THB LAw
OP nm UNITED NATIONS 127 (1950). But the American delegate in Committee I/2
maintained that "in an organization of sovereign states it was clear that all members would
possess the faculty of withdrawal••••" 7 U.N. CoNP. Doc. 262 at 265 (1945). U.N.
Charter, art. 2(1), provides: "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members." Cf. KELsEN, THE LAw oP nm UNITED NATIONS 125 (1950).
5 But general international law conditions lawful withdrawal' from treaties upon consent of all parties, a necessary implication of the rule pacta sunt servmu1a. See Harvard
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT. L. SUPP. 655 at 661 and 977
(1935), art. 20 entitled "Pacta Sunt Servanda." As applied to such a basic question as
renunciation or withdrawal, the contention that general international law is superior to the
Charter has raised some controversy. While the concept "international law" is mentioned
in articles 1 and 13, the Charter does not expressly accept its superiority or subordination
to general international law. But the Charter is doubtless superior where its express language modifies previous rules of the law of nations. U.N. Charter, art. 103. See Verdross,
"The Charter of the United Nations and General International Law," in LAw AND PouTICS IN THI! WoRLD CoMMUNlTY, Lipsky ed., 153 (1953); Wright, The Outlawry of
War and the Law of War," 47 AM. J. INT. L. 365, 372 (1953); Taubenfeld, "International Actions and Neutrality," 47 AM. J. INT. L. 377, 384 et seq. (1953). But the
Charter probably continues to rely on the general international law of treaties for support
on technical matters, although even this need not be true if progressive development
requires a different principle. Cf. Kunz, "General International Law and the Law of International Organizations," 47 AM. J. INT. L. 456 (1953).
6 See generally, Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Review of the United Nations Charter, 83d Cong., 2d sess. 10-11, 72, 104, 110, 149 (1954)
[hereinafter cited Hearings (1954)]; Eisenhower, "Proclaiming Our Faith Anew," 28
DEPT. OP STATE BUL. 167 (1953); Truman, "U.S. Foreign Policy in Review," 28 DEPT.
OP STATE BUL. 43 (1953); Revision of the United Nations Charter, S. Rep. No. 2501,
81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950) •.
7 The United Nations Members' views on Charter revision generally are collected in
GENERAL AssBMBLY OFFICIAL REcoRDs, 8th sess., Sixth Committee 55-105 (1953);
"Documentation of All Charter Proceedings at San Francisco," 15 U.N. BUL. 446 (1953).
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loss in the integrity of all international agreements. Under these
circumstances, the renunciation technique fails to meet the minimum
requirements of a workable alternative approach.
Similar problems would combine to frustrate proposals tending
toward the other extreme of radical extension of United Nations competence. By forcing a "revolutionary displacement''8 of the United
Nations, it is conceivable that a Charter revision conference could
turn itself into a constitutional convention and produce a draft world
constitution or a Charter revised to exclude the Soviet Union. Given
the backing of de facto power, such a revolution would probably be
legal if effectively established,9 but political objections to world government10 or exclusion of the USSR11 would be decisive. Thus the
process of "revolutionary displacement" exists as a legal possibility,
8 ''Revolutionary displacement" takes place when one regime effectively replaces
another by illegal methods. De facto power then combines with legal color of the new
regime to overcome any inconsistency with the old. Should a member of the United
Nations enter any agreement inconsistent with the Charter, article 103 provides that the
Charter shall prevail. Since the schemes for world government or exclusion of the USSR
would probably violate the Charter, they would constitute "revolutionary displacements"
if effective.
9 While analytical theorists may dispute extensions of Professor Kelsen's doctrine of
"effectiveness" as a necessary condition to the validity of a particular rule of law [:KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 117 et seq. (1949); KELsEN, PRINCIPLES oF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 214, 289, 412 (1952); Tucker, "The Principle of Effectiveness in
International Law" in LAw AND PoLITics IN THE WoRLD COMMUNITY, Lipsky ed., 31
(1953); Morgenthau, "Positivism, Functionalism, and International.Law," 34 AM.. J. INT.
L. 260 (1940)], there seems to be general agreement that effective displacement of the
basic structure of legal institutions results in a new and valid regime. See authorities,
supra; Kunz, ''Revolutionary Creation of Norms of International Law," 41 AM. J. INT. L.
119 (1947); Verdross, "The Charter of the United Nations and General International
Law,'' in LAw AND PoLITics IN THE WoRLD COMMUNITY, Lipsky ed., 154 (1953);
White, "How to Amend the United Nations Charter," 37 A.B.A.J. 431 (1951).
10 Support for world government proposals is presently insufficient to permit consideration as reasonable substantive possibilities. See Hearings (1954) at 79, 107, 114, 134
for specific statements relating to world government. In 1950 the Department of State
took a position clearly contrary to world government proposals. See Hearings before the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Revision of the United Nations Charter, 81st
Cong., 2d sess. 398, 408, 410, 427, 428, 438 (1950) [hereinafter cited Hearings (1950)];
Revision of the United Nations Charter, S. Rep. No. 2501, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 29, 30, 47
(1950). If the view of the executive branch is thus contrary, the legislative is one of patent
hostility. Sec. 110 of the Department of State Appropriation Act, 1954, provides: "None
of the funds appropriated in this title shall be used (1) to pay the United States contn'bution to any international organization which engages in the direct or indirect promotion
of the principle or doctrine of one world government or one world citizenship; (2) for the
promotion, direct or indirect, of the principle or doctrine of one world government or one
world citizenship." 67 Stat. L. 367 at 372 (1953). Identical provision was made in the
appropriation for 1953. 66 Stat. L. 549 at 556 (1952).
11 Thus spokesmen for the Department of State have consistently supported the view
that advantage lies with the policy keeping the Soviets within the organization. See
Hearings (1950); Dulles, in Hearings (1954) at 10-11, 23, 25, and for general views, at
41-42, 68, 79, 80, 84, 88, 104, 105, 115.
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but as a practical matter it seems to ignore the familiar dictum that
"politics is the art of the possible."
Thus departing from both extremes of renunciation and revolutionary displacement, it remains to examine the less extensive but
more workable devices which may be used to perfect changes within
the existing United Nations framework. For this purpose, the formal
amendment is important primarily for its popular currency, the techniques of "subordinate consistent agreement" and "interpretation and
practice" for their feasibility. Because these three legal tools have
individual constellations of implications, each will be considered separately with the substantive proposals dependent upon its function
and application.

II. The Possibilities of Revision by Formal Amendment
Current proposals to modify the United Nations Charter tend to
center upon the formal amendment process. This procedure has
always been permitted by general international law, ordinarily through
the routine substitution of a new agreement for the old. To effect
such a change, a corollary of pacta sunt servanda requires unanimous
participation or consent.12 That is to say, one treaty could not replace a prior inconsistent treaty without consent of all the parties.
Any lesser doctrine would destroy the rule that treaty obligations
must be carried out in good faith. However accepted the unanimous
consent rule may be, nothing precludes signatories from waiving in
advance their right to insist that a treaty otherwise valid and subsisting remain executory until each party consents to a change. This
is the case with the United Nations Charter.
Chapter XVIII of the Charter spells out two distinct procedures
for adoption of formal amendments. Like the Constitution of the
United States, the Charter separates the procedures of proposal and
ratification required to perfect an amendment. Article I 08 provides
for the proposal of amendments by the General Assembly. At this
stage a mere two-thirds majority vote in the Assembly is required.
Since the Security Council's participation is unnecessary, no veto
power threatens this procedure. The second proposal procedure en12 Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM.. J. INT. L. SUPP. 655
at 661 and 977 (1935). Art. 20, entitled "Pacta Sunt Servanda," provides: "A state is
bound to carry out in good faith the obligations which it has assumed by a treaty (pacta
sunt servanda)." 1£ a subsequent agreement were permitted to modify the Charter without
consent of all signatories, its binding effect would be lost. See U.N. Charter, art. 103.
Application of general international law to the Charter is discussed in note 5 supra.
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visages the use of a general conference independent of the United
Nations. By a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly, any seven members of the Security Council concurring, a general conference for
review of the Charter may be held at any time. Anticipating the
possible disuse of the conference method, the framers of the Charter
provided a special procedure to be followed by the Assembly at its
tenth annual session. If, at the time the tenth General Assembly
convenes, there has been no general conference for revision, the Charter requires that the agenda of that Assembly contain a proposal to
call the conference. This does not, of course, require the calling of
a conference; it merely ensures that the conference device will be
seriously considered. Under this provision instead of a two-thirds
vote of the Assembly, a mere majority-thirty-one votes-is required
to call the conference. In either case the Security Council must concur by a vote of any seven of its members, but this is a matter not
within the veto power of the permanent members. Once established
by either procedure, the conference proposes amendments by a twothirds majority, each member of the United Nations having one vote,
none retaining the power to veto proposals of specific amendments.
In short, the proposal process, whether utilized by the General Assembly or the conference, requires a mere two-thirds vote. No separate action is required by the Security Council; no veto power exists
at this stage.
If the proposal procedure thus outlined offers promise of success,
the ratification procedure offers promise of much less. Whether proposed by the Assembly or conference procedure, the ratification requirements are identical in each case. Chapter XVIII requires that
amendments be ratified in accordance with their constitutional processes by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including
all the permanent members of the Security Council. Hence proposed
amendments may fail to come into force by ~issent of either the
United States, United Kingdom, France, China, or the Soviet Union.
Even this assumes that two-thirds of the membership will ratify the
proposed amendments. Such being the case, one may venture to
suggest that the proposal of amendments by Assembly or conference
looms large as a real possibility, but the sufficient number of ratifications in all likelihood failing, the actual coming into force of amendments is at best extremely unlikely. The political significance and
attendant dangers of proposal without subsequent ratification is considered below in a different connection.
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Current interest in Charter amendment revolves around the conference device. The tenth Assembly meets in the fall of 1955. By
a majority of thirty-one votes that Assembly may, and best guesses
predict it will, call a general conference to be held in 1956 or 1957.
Preparatory work setting up the preliminary foundations for such a
conference is already well under way in the United Nations13 and
the United States.14 As early as November 1953 the great majority
of United Nations members evidenced support for calling the general
conference.15
Granting the probability that the conference will be convened,
concrete proposals for revision assume considerable importance. Many
such proposals have been suggested since the United Nations began
to function. As the time for the conference approaches, however, at
this very early stage, governments have taken generally a cautious
attitude. Outspoken proposals by United Nations members are now
conspicuous by their absence. In November 1953, when the Assembly's legal committee met to suggest certain preparatory activity,
only a few governments used that opportunity to express support for
concrete proposals. The representatives of Panama and Nicaragua declared their acceptance of a proposal to eliminate the veto in membership matters.16 Nicaragua further suggested the need to remedy international problems arising out of atomic energy and self-determination of peoples developments.17 Other governments were generally
13 On November 28, 1953 the General Assembly passed by a vote of 54-5 a resolution
initiating preparatory work. U.N. Doc. NResolution/133, Nov. 28, 1953. See GENBRAL
AssEMBLY OFFICIAL REcoRDs, 8th sess., Sixth Committee 55-105 (1953); Liang,
"Preparatory Work for a Possible Revision of the United Nations Charter," 48 AM. J.
htt. L. 83 (1954); Byrnes, "Preparatory Work to Begin on Review of U.N. Charter," 29
DEPT. OF STATE BUL. 908, 909 (1953); "Documentation of All Charter Proceedings at
San Francisco," 15 U.N. Bm.. 446 (1953). The Legal Committee of the Assembly
decided not to solicit views on substantive proposals at this early date, but supported 48-5
the resolution as finally passed by the Assembly, id. at 495. The resolution requests the
Secretary General to prepare and publish a systematic compilation of unpublished San
Francisco documents, a complete index of the documents of that Conference, and a repertory of the practice of the United Nations organs appropriately indexed.
14 During July 1953, the Senate authorized the creation of a Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee to make a full study of proposals to amend or otherwise modify existing
international peace and security organizations. S. Res. 126, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953),
as amended by S. Res. 193, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954); "Review of U.N. Charter," 29
DEPT. OF STATE BUL. 310 (1953); "Revision of U.N. Charter," id. at 343; Hearings
(1954).
15 See authorities collected in note 13 supra.
16 "Documentation of All Charter Proceedings at San Francisco," 15 U.N. BuL. 446,
449, 493 (1953).
11 Id. at 493.
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noncommittal.18 A generally favorable attitude was expressed by the
United States representative, Mr. Byrnes, who emphasized the importance of ". . . utilizing the full opportunity this presents in its
[the United Nations'] quest for a peaceful world order under
law ....19 Secretary Dulles had adverted to revision in similarly general language at the August 1953 American Bar Association meeting,20
though several weeks earlier he thought it was timely to state that
the "Department [of State] will favor the calling of the review conference when the question is put to the 1955 session of the United
Nations General Assembly."21 At that time Secretary Dulles continued to believe "that final United States policies on this question
must await full public discussion of the issues as well as consultations with members of Congress,"22 thus reaffirming earlier statements
stressing the importance of wide participation in preparation.23 Congressional interest is indicated by authorization of a Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee to study proposals to amend, revise, or otherwise modify international peace and security organizations.24 On
January 18, 1954, Mr. Dulles appeared before this Subcommittee to
state for the first time the State Department's views on specific areas
for possible reform. These included removal of the veto from membership and pacific settlement matters, a new approach to disarmament problems, and a procedure for settling credentials disputes. He
questioned, moreover, the adequacy of Charter provisions dealing with
the General Assembly voting and the role of international law in
United Nations affairs. 211 Nevertheless, the Department's attitude
remains cautious and noncommittal, Mr. Dulles asking to be excused
qom categorical answers to detailed questions on possible changes.
18 Other opinions were expressed in the General Assembly meeting in plenary session
during September 1953. See excerpts reproduced in REVIllw OF THB UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER (Documents), 83d Cong., 2d sess. No. 87 at 779-816 (1954). Suggestions
tending to support revision of the veto power were made by Peru, id. at 782, Ecuador, id.
at 787, Dominican Republic, id. at 795, Iceland, id. at 795, and Lebanon, id. at 804. Revision of the present formula for Security Council representation was suggested by Syria, id.
at 797, revision of the non-self-governing territories provisions by France, id. at 798, and
membership proposals were made by Costa Rica, id. at 801.
19 "Documentation of All Charter Proceedings at San Francisco," 15 U.N. BUL. 446,
449 (1953).
20 Dulles, "U.S. Constitution and U.N. Charter: an Appraisal," 29 DEPT. OF STATE
BaL. 307 at 310, 343 (1953).
21 Dulles, "Review of the U.N. Charter," 29 DEPT. oF STATE BUL. 310 at 311 (1953);
REVIllw OF THB U.N. CHARTER (Documents), 83d Cong., 2d sess., No. 87 at 779 (1954).
22 Dulles, ''Review of the U.N. Charter," 29 DEPT. OF STATE BUL. 310 at 311 (1953).
23 Dulles, ''Revision of the U.N. Charter," 29 DEPT. OF STATE BaL. 343 (1953).
24 Supra note 14.
25 Hearings (1954) at 4-34.
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Other views expressed in the United Nations favorable to the conference suggested the possibility of revision activity recreating an atmosphere which would lead to the discovery of new avenues of cooperation26 or at least showing how the charter has been misinterpreted and abused in practice.27 Members opposed to extensive and
radical change were few in number. Only Afganistan, Yugoslavia,
Sweden, and Peru28 expressed such views, which, if maintained,
would not necessarily preclude changes of a minor character.
Most consistently opposed to steps even preliminary to a general
conference were representatives of the Soviet bloc. They refused to
admit the constitutionality of preliminary work and expressed the
strongest opposition to suggested proposals of a substantive character.
Indicating a threat of Soviet veto against proposals submitted to ratification, the Czech delegate adverted to the "inviolability of the Charter."29 Similarly, reference was made to the conformity of the veto
power with "international law," implying perhaps that Soviet spokesmen elevate to an "inalienable right" the voting procedure presently
established in the Charter.30 In any case these and other31 statements referring to the revision concept as an aggressive device likely
to do great damage to the organization offer ample evidence from
which the only reasonable conclusion is that any amendments proposed by the general conference may expect failure of ratification by
the USSR.32 This being true, grave doubts exist regarding the utility
of the amendment process.
What remains then as favorable in the formal amendment approach from the standpoint of the United Nations development and
American foreign policy? Having shown that the conference will
probably be held, and the conference may adopt resolutions without
the veto problem, the key question goes to the utility of having such
26 "Documentation of All Charter Proceedings at San Francisco," 15 U.N. BUL. 449
(1953).
27Ibid.
28 Jd. at 448, 449.
29 Id. at 448.
SO Ibid.
81 Ibid; Mr. Vyshinsky's statement before the General Assembly, Sept. 21, 1953,
REvmw oF nm llNI'l'l!D NATIONS CHARTHR (Documents), 83d Cong., 2d sess., No. 87 at
780 (1954).
8 2 Jn his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee, Ambassador Lodge made clear
his belief that the Soviets would veto any amendments proposed by the West. Hearings
(1954) at 42, 44. But Secretary Dulles was more optimistic when he said, "We can
reasonably make our plans on the working hypothesis that no one nation will, in fact, be
able arbitrarily either to impose changes or to veto changes," id. at 9, and " ••• I am not
discouraged at all at the possibilities of having some changes here, if they seem reasonable
and if they have a strong backing from world opinion." Id. at 23.
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proposed amendments put to the membership knowing they will not
come into force. Assuming that such amendments would not be
forced into acceptance against the will of the USSR,33 two possible
rhetorical advantages suggest themselves for analysis.
The first rhetorical advantage of the amendment process would
be an increase in activity and serious thought about United Nations
affairs. 34 Preliminary work is already producing intense activity and
a new literature on the United Nations will doubtless appear as the
Charter revision conference approaches. Increased thought and activity emphasizing the idea and symbolism of the United Nations
would tend to increase the broad basis of support for the United
Nations and the principle of international cooperation. If public
opinion works a decisive inB.uence on the conduct of foreign relations,
a broader base of thought sympathetic to the United Nations concept may facilitate more extensive reliance upon United Nations procedures by the member governments. This in turn, through a cyclical
effect, conduces independently to further support for international
cooperation and collective security. Law and community interacting
in a primitive organizational context gradually lay the basis for a
stable international society of nations amenable to a regime of law.35
If it is possible to say that movements furthering these developments
support the purposes of the United Nations, and these ar~ "interests"
of the United Nations, then it can be argued that rhetorical use of
the amendment process conduces to the interests of world organization. If this were the only effect of rhetorical usage, where the
amendments are expected to fail of ratification, the entire procedure
would not be objectionable from the standpoint of the United Nations interests.
But these assumptions neglect the second and more questionable
rhetorical use of the revision process. It was the Panamanian delegate to the General Assembly who adverted to the amendment procedure as a means of showing abuse of the Charter.3·6 The danger
33 See note
34 Thus at

11 supra.
the outset of the Senate Subcommittee's 1954 Hearings, Senator Wiley,
after noting that there is a veto problem, further observed: "What we can do during this
study is to understand more fully what is involved in our present participation in the United
Nations and determine what changes, if any, we want to bring about and will work to
bring about with respect to this organization." Hearings (1954) at 3; Dulles, id. at 24.
35 Wright, ''Law and Politics in the World Community," in LAw AND Pou:ncs IN
nm WoRLD COMMUNITY, Lipsky ed., 3 at 13 (1953).
36 ''Documentation of all Charter Proceedings at San Francisco," 15 U.N. BuL. 449
(1953).

1954]

UN

CHARTER REVISION .

49

lies in the great powers actually using it for that purpose.37 To the
end of furthering the world power position of the United States, it
seems possible for the United States to push proposals through the
conference by the necessary two-thirds vote, and then use the ratification campaign as a power and rhetorical device to further discredit
and isolate the USSR. Dressed in appropriate ideological language,
the ratification campaign could probably lower the prestige of the
USSR by compelling it to "veto" amendments generally acceptable
to the United Nations membership but untenable to the USSR. At
best this would result in minimum advantage to the United States.
At worst it may induce the Soviets to withdraw further from active
participation in the organization's affairs. Surely the failure of ratification would result in the further frustration, not the realization,
of United Nations interests. The decision to use or not to use the
ratification campaign for power purposes thus turns on a necessary
and careful balancing of interests. When the considerations going
against the rhetorical use are supplemented by its tendency to discourage a sound basis of organizational development through interpretation and practice, the balance weighs heavily against use of the
formal amendment procedure to effect change.

III.

Effective Revision of the Charter by Subordinate
Consistent Agreement

A frequently used and readily available alternative technique of
change is the permissible subordinate international agreement.38 Treaties inconsistent with the Charter are clearly controlled by that document.30 Yet a large area for extension of obligation is not foreclosed
by the United Nations. Generally speaking, members40 may further
37 For a discussion of various uses of the conference method for Charter revision, see
Gross, "Revising the Charter," 32 FoREIGN AFFAIRS 203 at 205 (Jan. 1954). Perhaps
in anticipation of this difficulty, Secretary Dulles observed, ". • • while a charter review
conference should be welcomed as a means of strengthening the United Nations, difference
of opinion about how to do this should not then be pressed to a point such that the review
conference would result in undermining the United Nations or disrupting it. The United
Nations as it is, is better than no United Nations at all." Hearings (1954) at 9; also
Lodge, id. at 37.
38 See Dulles, Hearings (1954) at 11; How the United Nations Has Developed, Staff
Study No. 2, Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, 83d Cong., 2d sess. 12 (1954);
Engel, ''De Facto Revision of the Charter of the United Nations," 14 J. OF Po=cs 132
at 139 (1952).
39 Note 12 supra.
40 Non-members as well are limited by the Charter in respect to security matters,
U.N. Charter, art. 2(6), and treaties with members which conflict with the Charter. Art.
103. Otherwise non-members enjoy an equal right to participate in arrangements con-
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obligate themselves to pursue a course of action even in areas of
international relations on which the Charter speaks. Thus it is
assumed that the Charter does not preempt the fields of activity it
regulates. Since the Charter lays down a minimum body of rules,
members may re-enter the fields covered by the Charter and use the
treaty device to secure further restrictions on political discretion. Or
express rights held under the Charter may be waived by the members, so long as this procedure does not constitute a threat to the
peace. 41 Both techniques are supported by a long line of accepted
practice of United Nations organs and individual members. 42
At least within the purview of article 51, subordinate collective
security agreements are doubtless permissible and consistent with the
Charter. Regional arrangements predicated on subordinate agreements occupy the attention of Chapter VIII of the Charter. In pursuance to these provisions the western powers have entered such important agreements as the Rio Pact,4 3 the Bogota Charter,44 the North
Atlantic Pact,45 and the Pacific Security Agreements.46 Some such
subordinate agreements expressly recognize the legal superiority of
the Charter. 47 In at least one instance, the Bogota Charter, a security
agreement clearly extends its sphere of obligation beyond the area of
express Charter authorization, 48 thus suggesting a broader concept of
compatibility. Military and economic undertakings as recent as the
sistent with the Charter. Thus Italy and Portugal became signatories to the North Atlantic
Pact. See Hearings before Committee on Foreign Relations on the North Atlantic Treaty,
81st Cong., 2d sess., Pt. I at 93 (1949).
41 At some point, of course, waiver of rights affects the whole community adversely.
Basic rights affecting peace ought not to be within the waiver power, since the waiver may
effect a modification of the Charter violating art. 103. If, for example, two or more states
waive their right to freedom from the use or threat of force found in art. 2(4), then the
community as a whole suffers if violence follows. This is merely to show that limits to a
waiver power clearly exist, however illusive the controlling principle may be.
42 See p. 55 infra.
43 "Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,'' T.I.A.S. 1838; 17 DEPT. 011
S'l'ATE BUL. 565 (1947).
.
44 "Charter of the Organization of American States," T.I.A.S. 2361; 46 AM. J. !NT.
L. SUPP. 43 (1952).
45 34 U.N.T.S. 243; T.I.A.S. 1964, 63 Stat. L. 2241 (1949).
46 Pacific Security Agreement, T.I.A.S. 2493; Security Treaty with Japan, T.I.A.S.
2491 (1952); 25 DEPT. 01' S'l'ATE BUL. 148 (1951).
47 See art. 10 of the Rio Pact, supra note 43; art. 102 of the Bogota Charter, supra note
44; art. 7 of the North Atlantic Pact, supra note 45. Cf. Treaty Constituting the European
Defense Community, arts. 121, 122, Senate Executive Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 167,
203 (1952); Draft Treaty Embodying the Statute of the European Community, art. 72
(1953).
48 Note 44 supra, art. 25.
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Spanish-American agreements of 195349 offer continued support to
the view that members may enlarge upon their Charter obligations.
Possible use of this technique to expand the obligations of members
in their direct participation in the United Nations is shown by the
proposals contained in the famous Thomas-Douglas Resolution of
1950.50 While this resolution was not successful in the Senate, the
reasons for its failure were other than legal.51 Without formal amendment of the Charter, the Thomas-Douglas Resolution proposed voting
changes and implementation in the security structure of the United
Nations by a "supplementary agreement under article 51 open to all
members of the United Nations." The supplementary agreement
would bind its signatories to come to the aid of the victim of attack
if requested to do so by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly,
including three permanent members of the Security Council. Armed
forces for implementing the duty to aid the victim of attack would
be available in the spirit of article 43 of the Charter. The resolution
accordingly proposed a treaty eliminating the veto and earmarking in
advance specific military forces to be available to the Security Council
or General Assembly. To this extent the Thomas-Douglas Resolution went beyond the Vandenburg Resolution which called for supplementary agreements to remove the veto from pacific settlement
matters.52
•
The sound legal basis for the procedure adopted in the ThomasDouglas Resolution was forcefully put before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee by Professor Quincy Wright. He argued that
the Resolution conformed with the principles, purposes, and other
express provisions of the Charter, practice under the Charter, practice under the League Covenant, and legal doctrine properly laid down
by the World Court.58 Consequently, it may be agreed that use of
subordinate consistent agreements is firmly established as a permissible legal technique for effecting change of existing structures like
the United Nations.54
49 See Text of Defense Agreement in Agreements Concluded With Spain, 29 U.S.
DEPT. OP SrAT.E BDL. 436 (1953); Text of Economic Aid Agreement, ibid.; Text of
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, id. at 440.
50 S. Con. Res. 52, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949); Hearings (1950) at 2 et seq.; Revision of United Nations Charter, S. Rep. No. 2501, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 25 (1950).
61 Revision of United Nations Charter, S. Rep. No. 2501, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 27, 47,
53 (1950).
52 S. Res. 239, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948).
58 Testimony of Professor Wright, Hearings (1950) at 27 et seq.
64 Cf. Revision of the United Nations Charter, S. Rep. No. 2501, 81st Cong., 2d
sess, 27 (1950).
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Its legal basis once established, the subordinate consistent agreement device opens an avenue of considerable possibility. Changes
as extensive as the Atlantic Union rely upon this concept.55 Separate
agreements may be used to effect change in the structure and function of the United Nations in less ambitious ways already mentioned.
In fact most, if not all, proponents of formal amendment might first
rely upon the agreement process as a preliminary testing ground and
laboratory for experimentation before proceeding to formal amendment of the Charter. Thus conditioned by observation of a change
on a basis less than universal, intransigent dissenting states might
eventually be persuaded to participate or at least acquiesce. Untrammeled by the veto problem, this procedure provides a means for
the proponents of change to have their revision while the divisive
effects of renunciation, revolutionary displacement, and the vetoed
formal amendment are in the main successfully avoided. In more
precise terms, use of the subordinate consistent agreement procedure
may provide the West with desired changes without forever foreclosing
closer cooperation with the USSR. Any legal device which so nicely
balances the conllicting demands of progress and stability deserves the
utmost in attentive exploration.

IV. Effective Change through Interpretation and Practice
The :fifth and :final technique of change admissible to the United
Nations context lacks important incidents of the others already discussed. Growth and development of an existing structure through
interpretation and practice, the ancient, conservative, and often difficult technique lacks the force and drama inherent in renunciation,
revolutionary displacement, subordinate agreement, and formal amendment. But what the process of interpretation and practice lacks in
force and drama it gains in reliability and effectiveness.
Proponents of interpretation and practice as the preferable means
of change properly assume that the Charter cannot be modified by
formal amendment. This being the case, it is an easy next step to
show that the written Charter as presently constituted is the best
common denominator, the most acceptable statement of interests and
aspirations of the world community and its member states. Even to
the probably limited extent to which the USSR can now allow itself
to participate in the functions of the organization, that minimum participation may be preferable to none at all. Some changes being
55 See

testimony of Justice Roberts, Hearings (1950) at 232, 237, 238.
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desirable notwithstanding minority objection, the gradual method of
interpretation further assumes that its pragmatic, piecemeal, and sometimes awkward results are more acceptable than no change at all.
Any progressive change through this technique depends, moreover,
on a conception that the unamended Charter of 1945 can carry considerably more legal traffic,5 6 that the Charter, in other words, is sufficiently B.exible to permit extensive internal change without losing
its character as a regulator of international politics.
Two theories of interpretation compete to control the last assumption. Like the historical controversy central to interpretation of the
American Constitution, a concept of liberal versus restrictive interpretation raises controversy relative to the Charter in the international
sphere. Both have articulate advocates well armed with legal weapons
to support each view. Reduced to its simplest terms, the restrictive
view would argue that the United Nations has only that authority
and competence expressly delegated by the members in the San Francisco Charter.57 Growth in competence beyond the express grants
would be possible only through a formal amendment process, not
through interpretation and practice. On the other hand, the liberal
view emphasizes the constitutional character of the Charter with the
organization deriving its powers from express functions and purposes
56 Thus Secretary Dulles has observed, "The defects in the charter can to a considerable extent be corrected by practices which are permissible under the charter." Hearings
(1950) at 8. In 1950, Dean Rusk said, " ••• there is no question but that the Charter can
carry much more traffic if its members desire to have it do so.'' Hearings (1950) at 385.
The ability of the Charter to grow without formal change depends in part on the ambiguity of its constitutive instrument. The controlling work showing this ambiguity is
KELSEN, THE LAw OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1950). See also, How the United Nations
Charter Has Developed, Staff Study No. 2, Senate Subcommittee on the United Nations
Charter, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954); ENGEL, "De Facto Revision of the Charter of the
United Nations," 14 J. OF POLITICS 132 at 133 (1952).
57 The Charter seems to add some support to the restrictive view. Art. 2(1), acknowledging that the "Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members," combines with the domestic jurisdiction reservation of art. 2(7) to narrow the
scope of United Nations authority. Thus grounded by these two provisions on "sovereign
equality," it can be argued that the members intended to part with only that authority
expressly granted the United Nations in the Charter. All else is reserved to the sovereign
members; grants of power in derogation of sovereignty are not to be presumed. Some
authority for this view is found in International Court of Justice decisions. See dissenting
opinion of Judge Hackworth, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, I.C.J. Rep. 174 at 198 (1949): "There can be no gainsaying the fact that the
Organization is one of delegated and enumerated powers. It is to be presumed that such
powers as the Member States desire to confer upon it are stated either in the Charter or
in complementary agreements concluded by them. Powers not expressed cannot be freely
implied. Implied powers flow from a grant of expressed powers, and are limited to those
that are 'necessary' to the exercise of the powers expressly granted.'' See also, Competence
of the General Assembly for Admission of a State to the United Nations, I.C.J. Rep. 4 at
8 (1950). Cf. Lauterpacht, "Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness
in the Interpretation of Treaties," 26 BmT. Y.B. !Nr. L. 48 (1949).
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as well as specific grants in its constitutive document. The proponents of liberal construction, accordingly, produce a rule allowing the
organization such competence necessary to enable it to act in any way
consistent with its functions and purposes except where the Charter
expressly prohibits action.68 Considered as technical legal choices between competing concepts of treaty interpretation, neither restrictive
nor liberal concepts find universal acceptance in doctrine and practice. Yet in a context limited to organic treaties such as the United
Nations Charter, the preponderant authority of international law, including the opinion Qf the World Court' 9 and international practice,60
precludes the restrictive and emphatically supports the liberal view
as the law of the Charter.
Taken within the range of its fullest possible impact, the liberal
view opens the door to far-reaching changes. Developed to their fullest
potentials, the purposes of maintaining peace and security, developing
friendly relations among nations, achieving cooperation in economic,
social, cultural or humanitarian spheres,61 and establishing conditions
under which justice and respect for the obligations of international
law can be maintained,62 it is not altogether impossible that the United
58 This approach is variously characterized as "liberal,'' "effective," "functional/'
"rational," "pmposive," interpretation and sometimes "progressive development." These
terms are used interchangeably in this discussion.
59 The controlling and now classic case is Reparations for Injury Suffered in Service
of the United Nations, I.C.J. Rep. 174 (1949); 43 AM.. J. INT. L. 589 (1949). Speaking
of the United Nations, the Court said, "It must be acknowledged that its Members, by
entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed
it with the competence required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged.'~
I.C.J. Rep. 179 (1949); 43 AM.. J. INT. L. 589 at 592 (1949). To the same point the
Court added, "Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those
powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.'' I.C.J. Rep. 182
(1949); 43 AM.. J. INT. L. 595. This definitely marks an acceptance of the liberal view.
See on this decision, Wright, ''The Jura! Personality of the United Nations,'' 43 AM.. J.
INT. L. 509 (1949); comment, 48 Mi:cH. L. REv. 496 (1950); Hambro, "A Case of
Development of International Law Through the International Court of Justice in LA.w AND
PoLITics IN THB WoRLD COMMUNITY, Lipsky ed., 243 (1953). Other cases supporting
the liberal view include: Corfu Channel Case, I.C.J. Rep. I at 24 (1949); Competence
of the International Labour Organization in the Matter of the Regulation of Conditions of
Work of Persons Employed in Agriculture, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 2 at 9, 1 HuDSON, WoRLD
CouRT REPORTS 124 (1922); Interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne, P.C.I.J., Ser. B,
No. 12 at 6, I HUDSON, WoRLD CoURT REPORTS 722 (1925); dissenting opinions of Judges
Azevedo and Alvarez in Competence of the General Assembly for Admission of a State
to the United Nations, I.C.J. Rep. 4 at 12, 22 (1950). Cf. U.N. Charter, art. 13(l)(a).
60 See authorities collected in Lauterpacht, "Restrictive Interpretation ' and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties," 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT. L. 48 (1949);
Wright, "National Courts and Human Rights-The Fugii Case," 45 AM.. J. INT. L. 62
(1951).
61 U.N. Charter, art. 1 (1, 2, 3).
62 U.N. Charter Preamble; for "principles" implementing the Preamble and the
PUipOSes of art. 1, see art. 2.

1954]

UN

CHARTER REVISION

55

Nations as presently constituted could progress to encompass elements
of government far more extensive than those found in its present
operating structure. Through a development program one may characterize as "creeping world government," even extreme proposals for
a legislative power in the General Assembly, powers to tax, to establish a United Nations police guard, to eliminate the veto, to achieve
universality of membership and compulsory judicial jurisdiction, may
find effective implementation when the community is prepared to
submit to a regime of United Nations law. 63 Without the difficulties inherent in the formal amendment process, even such radical
modifications of the operating structure of the United Nations exist
as possible developments through interpretation and practice.
If radical change is thus made legally possible, certainly the modest
proposals for formal amendment need not perish upon the obstacles
to that procedure. The doctrine of functional interpretation provides
a more workable and efficacious technique for modest, pragmatic
adaptation of the Charter to changed circumstances and aspirations
of the world community. In even the few years of its existence, the
Charter has shown considerable B.exibility and capacity to adjust to
necessary or convenient changes. Of the many available examples
showing such development,64 two are chosen for closer examination.
Two significant impediments to effective application of the United
Nations have been reduced through interpretation and practice. When
the United Nations had legal competence to act, the great power
veto posed an insurmountable hurdle to effective action. The limitation excluding matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"
of the states concerned posed a second limitation even in the absence
of frustration by veto. Yet several years practice drastically narrowed
the effective range of the veto power and all but destroyed the domestic jurisdiction limitation.
The veto power is simply a requirement that the permanent members lodge a concurring vote on all matters of substance in the Security
63 Taken in its widest application, the concepts of liberal interpretation and "progressive development," U.N. Charter, art. 13(1)(a), could legally admit of these extreme
advances in the organization's competence. But only when the political base supporting
such radical change exists would they become more than mere legal possibilities. Obviously
the required political climate does not presently exist.
64 For other examples of development by interpretation and practice, see generally
GooDRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER oP THE UNITED NATIONS (1949); KELsEN, THB LAw
OP THE UNITED NATIONS (1950); Engel, "De Facto Revision of the Charter of the United
Nations," 14 J. OP POLITICS 132 (1952); How the United Nations Charter Has Developed,
Staff Study No. 2, Senate Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, 83d Cong., 2d
sess. (1954).
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C01.1~cil. 65 No action may be taken without the concurring votes of
the United Kingdom, France, China, the United States, and the
Soviet Union. In short the "veto problem," from the standpoint of
the United States stems from the politics of the USSR combined
with the Soviet power tq veto measures running against its interests
or favoring the interests of the western powers. Wide use of the
Soviet veto in such situations created the "veto problem" and the
more serious danger that the United Nations would consequently fail
in its efforts to preserve the peace through a universal concept of
organization. 66
The year 1950 brought several changes highlighting interpretation and practice as workable tools against the veto power. Only the
fortuitous circumstance of the Soviet representative's absence in the
Security Council during June and July made the Korea Resolutions
of those months possible. 67 The Council's action determining North
Korea the aggressor, 68 recommending enforcement measures,69 and
creating the Unified Command70 unquestionably required the concurring votes of all permanent members, including the USSR. But
the Soviet representative being absent, the resolutions lacked the con6 5 The relevant provisions of art. 27 provide as follows: "Decisions of the Security
Council on procedural matters shall be made by an aflinnative vote of seven members."
Art. 27(2). "Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an
aflinnative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members;
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party
to a dispute shall abstain from voting." Art. 27(3). The literature on the veto is collected
in SoHN, CAsEs ON WoRLD LA.w 669 (1950). See JIMINEZ DE AlracHAGA, VOTING AND
THE HANDLING op DxsPuTEs IN THE SECURITY CoUNCIL (1950); Gross, "The Double
Veto and the Four-Power Statement on Voting in the Security Council,'' 67 HAitv. L.
REv. 251 (1953); The Problem of the Veto in the United Nations Security Council,
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, Staff Study No. 1,
83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954).
66 The ultimate source of the "veto problem" is clearly found in the political relations
of the U.S. and the USSR. The veto problem is only a legal reflection of the cold war.
Probably its greatest effect upon the legal structure is found in the development of
regional and self-defense structures with power to act. without threat of the Soviet veto.
See van Kle.lfens, ''Regionalism and Political Pacts," 43 AM. J. INT. L. 666 (1949);
Heindel, Kalijarvi, and Wilcox, ''The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate,"
43 AM. J. INT. L. 633 (1949). Similar reactions of the Soviets gave impetus to security organizations in Eastern Europe separate from the United Nations. See Kulski, ''The Soviet
System of Collective Security Compared With the Western System,'' 44 AM.. J. INT. L. 453
(1950). In both cases the probable frustration of future action by the United Nations led
to reliance upon an essentially regional rather than a universal concept of security
organization.
67 In protest against the continued presence of the Chinese Nationalist representative,
the Soviet delegation boycotted the United Nations deliberations from January 13, 1950
to August 1, 1950. See "Enforcing Peace," 9 U.N. BUL. 143, 148, 149 (1950).
68 Resolution of June 25, 1950, U.N. Doc. S/1501.
69 Resolution of June 27, 1950, U.N. Doc. S/1511.
70 Resolution of July 7, 1950, U.N. Doc. S/1588.
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curring vote of a permanent member. Nevertheless the resolutions
were carried and never successfully impeached. On their face, the
resolutions appear illegal. 71 But their legality may nevertheless be
demonstrated through an analysis of practice and interpretation. First,
the inquiry must establish whether the voting formula actually requires a "concurring vote" to avoid the veto. Is any failure to lodge
a concurring vote a veto? A clear and consistent practice of the
Council provides a negative response to this question. Prior to the
Korea Resolutions, at least forty instances of abstention from voting
are recorded. 72 Abstention was never treated as a vote against a
Council measure; in no instance did the abstention of a great power
effect a veto. Even as early as August 1947, the then President of
the Security Council, Mr. F. El-Khouri of Syria, was able to say,
"I think it is now jurisprudence in the Security Council-and the
interpretation accepted for a long time-that an abstention is not considered a veto, and the concurrent votes of the permanent members
mean the votes of the permanent members who participate in the
voting. Those who abstain intentionally are not considered to have
cast a veto. That is quite clear." 73 No objections to the President's
formulation of the rule were recorded in the official records of the
Council. This inroad on the veto power, in effect interpreting "concurring vote" to mean "absence of an express negative vote," was
adequately confirmed by practice and acquiescence. The opening
petard once established, it was much easier to deal with the effect of
· vote"
·
a permanent member'sb
a sence. Th"
e concurnng
reqmrement
reduced to the "no express negative rule," the absolute character of
the veto was lost. The "abstention" concept provided the category
in which the "absence problem" was laid to rest. But no clear practice solved this problem. An absence had not yet been considered
an "abstention" for veto purposes. Consequently, to treat this question of £rst instance, the better approach dwelled heavily upon the
rule of functional or rational interpretation and progressive develop71 The Soviet argument against the legality of the Korea Resolutions is summarized in
"Enforcing Peace," 9 U.N. BUL. 143 (1950). Should the illegality of the Korea Resolutions be established, then participation in the action by the Unified Command forces could
violate United Nations Charter, art. 2(4) which obligates members to refrain from the use
or threat of force in their international relations. See also, Kunz, "Legality of the Security
Council Resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950," 45 AM. J. !Nr. L. 137 (1951); KELSBN,
THE I.Aw OF THE UNITED NATIONS (Supplement 1951).
72 The practice of abstention in the Security Council is discussed in Liang, "Abstention and Absence of a Permanent Member in Relation to the Voting Procedure in the
Security Council," 44 AM. J. !Nr. L. 694 at 696 (1950).
73SEcumTY CoUNcrL OFFICIAL REcoRDs, 2d Year, No. 68 at 1711 (1947).
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ment. Thus McDougal and Gardner, discussing this concept and
its application to the veto problem; argued: 'When the march of
events inevitably lays bare ambiguities and alternatives of interpretation . . . , even the most modest deference to rationality must require that interpretation . . . which best promotes the major purposes . . ." of the institutions under consideration.74 Applying the
major purposes of the Charter to this aspect of the veto problem, the
authors forcefully conclude that absence of a permanent member cannot frustrate the work of the Security Council.75 To allow one member to absent itself and disable the organization is to invite anarchy,
not fulfillment of the United Nations purpose to maintain and enforce peace. From the immediate consequences of the Korean episode, then, two limitations upon the veto were sharpened and developed. The abstention rule was further established and broadened
to include the voluntary absence of a permanent member.
- A third and perhaps more drastic limitation upon the veto in practice had its origin in thoughts prior to, as well as contemporary with,
the Korean action. Sometime before the Korean problem arose, the
threat of a Soviet veto to measures directed against possible Soviet
aggression, created substantial doubt that the United Nations would
be able to act against such aggression. Suggestions then appeared
directing attention to the General Assembly and its- possible role as
an agency of collective security in the event Council action were frustrated by the veto." 6 These ideas were sharpened by the Korean episode and the fortuitous circumstances permitting action without the
veto in that case. On the correct assumption that the Soviets would
return to the Security Council to prevent by veto such United Nations
action in the future, increased attention to the possibilities in the
General Assembly led to the "Acheson Plan" 77 which culminated in
the General Assembly resolution "Uniting For Peace" of November
3, 1950.78
The Uniting for Peace Resolution provides, inter alia, "that if the
Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent mem74 McDougal and Gardner, ''The Veto and the Charter: an Interpretation for Survival,"
60 YALB L.J. 258 at 266 (1951).
75 Id. at 266, 272.
76 Hearings (1950) at 415; Bancroft, "Strengthening The United Nations," PnoCl!EDINGS oF THE AM:smCAN SocmTY OF INrBRNATIONAL LAW 149 at 152 (1950); Goodrich, "Strengthening the United Nations: Maintenance of International Peace and Security," id. at 143, 147; Wright, id. at 166.
77 Acheson, ''The Peace the World Wants," 23 DEPT. OF STATE BUL. 523 at 525
(1950).
.
78 GENERAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL REcoRDs, 5th sess., Supp. No. 20, p. 10 (1950).
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bers, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security in any case where there appears to
be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the
General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view
to making appropriate recommendations to the Members for collective measures, including in the case of a threat to the peace or act
of aggression, the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or
restore international peace and security." Analytical arguments going
to the validity of "Uniting for Peace" seem generally to favor the
conclusion that it does not conform to the letter of the 1945 Charter. 79 This is supported by the framer's rather clear assumption that
in fact only the Security Council would take action involving armed
force, the Assembly to have authority to operate in the field of peace
and security but not to the point of recommending to the members
that they use armed force against an aggressor determined as such by
the Assembly. While this is not the place to deal with the details
of analytical argument in this respect,80 it would seem that the best
justification for the resolution's legality lies in the progressive development concept. Certainly one can argue that the better test of
legality is furtherance of the purposes and functions of the United
Nations. If the resolution "Uniting for Peace," by removing the veto
from situations affecting the peace, does in fact tend to advance the
organization's effective competence to maintain international peace
and security, then no analytical complaint can invalidate the resolution. 81 Thus the principle of functional interpretation has been used
79 Exclusive authority to determine and deal with threats to the peace was vested in
the Security Council. See Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the
United Nations Charter, 79th Cong., 1st sess., S. Ex. Rep. No. 8 (1945). See also the
arguments of Mr. Vyshinsky in the United Nations, GENERAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL REcORDs, 5th Year, First Committee, 80, 118, 132 (1950); GENERAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL
REcoRDs, 5th Year, Plenary Meetings, 324-334 (1950); Km.sEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 953 (Supplement 1951).
so Bancroft, "The United Nations as a Collective Security Organization," PnocEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SoCIETY OF brrERNATIONAL LAw 159 (1951); Wright, "Collective Security in the Light of the Korean Experience," id. at 165; Cohen, "Principles Governing the Imposition of Sanctions under the United Nations Charter,'' id. at 153; Woolsey,
"The Uniting for Peace Resolution of the United Nations,'' 45 AM. J. INT. L. 129 (1951).
81 See remarks of Mr. Gutierrez of Cuba, GENERAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL REcoRDs, 5th
Year, Plenary Meetings, at 321, 323 (1950). Mr. Romulo of the Philippines declared,
"This authority springs from broad powers of the General Assembly under the Charter,
from the United Nations inherent right of survival and from its supreme responsibility to
all the world's peoples to preserve peace. No legal technicality, however brilliantly advanced, can prevail against the overriding force of this threefold principle," id. at 295. See
extended argument of Mr. Costa Du Rels of Bolivia and authorities cited, id. at 313 et seq.
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to expand the competence of the veto-less Assembly, showing the Charter's clear capacity for growth in an area charged with severe political
consequences and difficulties.
The second impediment to United Nations action altered materially through interpretation and practice is the equally familiar· "doctrine of domestic jurisdiction." A favorite of theorists for its theoretical assumptions and difficulties, the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction has raised similarly difficult problems in application. Article
2(7)82 of the Charter contains the most recent of many familiar formulas designed to limit the effective sphere of state obligations and
the competence of international organizations.83 Its primary function
is to parry the possible thrust of the operating provisions of treaties
and agreements. This was the purpose of article 2(7) of the Charter.84 It purported to remove from the United Nations the competence to intervene in social, economic, civil liberty, immigration, tariff,
form of government, and similar areas of state concern not ordinarily
subject to international controls. While other provisions of the Charter give the organization some authority to deal with those matters,
the reservation of domestic matters in turn revested exclusive authority
to deal with these questions in the members. Thus limiting the legal
competence of the United Nations at the outset, the domestic jurisdiction clause alarmed commentators to describe the organization as
materially disabled by express provisions in its Charter.85
Experience in practice during the first few years of its existence,
however, emphatically denies this role for article 2(7). Its intent and
language to the contrary, the domestic jurisdiction clause is presently
narrowed to preclude little if any action the organization would otherwise undertake.86 Over the objections of the Netherlands and the

82 U.N. Charter, art. 2(7) provides as follows: "Nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."
83 See Preuss, "Art. 2, Paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations and Matters
of Domestic Jurisdiction," 74 REcuEIL DBS CoURS DB L'ACADBMll! DB DRoIT INr:BRNAnoNAL 553 (1949).
84 Gross, "The Charter of the United Nations and the Lodge Reservations," 41 AM.
J. INT. L. 528, 550 (1947).
85 Ibid. See Kelsen, ''Limitations on the Functions of the United Nations/' 55 YALB
L.J. 997 (1946); Eagleton, "United Nations Aims and Structures,'' id. at 974, 979;
Goodrich, ''The Amount of World Organization Necessary and Possible,'' id. at 950, 964.
86 Goodrich, "United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction,'' 3 INT. One. 14, 28 (1949).
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United Kingdom, the reservation failed to prevent the United Nations from expressing itself on the character of the Franco government in Spain.87 Nor did it foreclose the vigorously protested action
against South Africa in relation to its discriminatory treatment of Indian minorities. 88 Arguments against the competence of the United
Nations to deal with the "civil wars" in Indonesia89 and Korea,90 with
human rights in Africa,91 Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary,92 Tunis and
Morocco03 have equally failed to prevent United Nations intervention. All of these disputes involved matters probably falling within
the domestic jurisdiction concept of 1945 broadly construed.04 Competence of the United Nations was in each case vigorously challenged.
But the challenges were adequately met with argument and principle
in each instance. Not once did the challenge prevail.
The key to understanding these disputes and the reconciliation of
intervention with the broad language of article 2(7) is provided by
interpretation and practice. The clause itself contains several terms
flexible enough to admit of narrow construction. If "intervention,"
"essentially," or "domestic jurisdiction" were limited by construction,
then the effect of the whole article would be contracted. To the extent the article is contracted, the competence of the United Nations
is extended. 'IJie concepts selected for this treatment were "essen87 JoURNAL OP THB SECURITY CoUNcrr., No. 28 at 549 (April 17, 1946); U.N.
GBNBRAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL R:scoRDs, 1st sess., pt. 2 (Resolutions) 63 (1946).
as See comment, ''The 'Domestic Jurisdiction' Limitation in the United Nations
Charter," 47 CoL. L. Rav. 268 (1947); Preuss, supra note 83, at 636 et seq.
B9SEctmITY CoUNCII. OFFICIAL R:scoRDs, 2d Year, No. 68 at 1659, 1703 (1947).
90 Korea Resolutions, supra notes 68-70. With regard to the domestic jurisdiction
issue see the argument of Mr. Jebb, SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RBcoRDs, 5th Year,
No. 28 at 4, 6 (1950).
01 See Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,
1952-1953, GBNBRAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL R:scoRDs, 8th sess., Supp. No. 1 at 31 (1953);
''Racial Situation in South Africa Reported on by Commission," 15 U.N. BuL. 486 (1953).
02 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, I.C.J. Rep.
65, 70 (1950). For a summary of United Nations action with respect to the problem of
human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, see Annual Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the Work of the Organization, 1950-1951, GBNBRAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL
R:scoRDs, 6th sess., Supp. No. 1 at 22 (1951).
OS Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 19521953, GENERAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL R:scoRDs, 8th sess., Supp. No. 1 at 35 (1953);
Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization 1951-1952,
GBNBRAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL R:scoRDs, 7th sess., Supp. No. 1 at 44 (1952); Howard,
''The Problems of Tunisia and Morocco in the Seventh Session of the General Assembly,"
28 DEPT. oP STATE BuL. 359 (1953); Dejany, "Competence of the General Assembly in
the Tunisian-Moroccan Questions," PROCEEDINGS OP THE AMERICAN SoCIETY OP l'NrmtNATIONAL LAW 53 (1953).
04 For legal arguments supporting a broad construction of the domestic jurisdiction
reservation, see K:ELsEN, THE LAw OP THE UNITED NATIONS 769 (1950).
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tially" and "domestic jurisdiction. "95 In most cases, the issue was:
What attributes force a matter into the concept "essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction" of a state? The results of discussion and decision suggest that only those matters not of "international concern,"
and otherwise domestic, fall within the article. This formulation has
been expressed in the United Nations debates,96 and provides the
best rule for reconciling the cases.97 If all matters of "international
concern" are international and not domestic in character, then article
2(7) no longer poses an obstacle to an extended United Nations competence. This being true, interpretation and practice have achieved
a two-fold result. The substance of domestic jurisdiction is rendered
ineffective against the United Nations action formerly falling within
95 Although discussion at various times urged a narrow construction of "intervention"
as well. Preuss, note 83 supra, at 605 et seq. To the framers, "intervention" seemed to
mean any action by the organization, probably including mere discussion. Report of Subcommittee B to Committee II/2, 9 U.N. Con£. Doc. 407 (1945). But "intervention" in
international law means the threat or use of force, at least something like "dictatorial
interference." 2 LAOTERPACHT, OPPENHBIM's lNrnRNATIONAL LAw, 7th ed., 150 (1952).
I£ this narrow construction were accepted, then all of the resolutions of the General Assembly challenged on the basis of domestic jurisdiction would be outside of the reservation and
hence permissible under the Charter. For none involved the use of force. It is suggested,
however, that the other concepts be broadened for this purpose. A civil war, for example,
is a domestic matter. It is out of the United Nations jurisdiction unless it falls within chapter
VII. If it does fall within chapter VII, as a threat to the peace, then the Security Council may
deal with it in pursuance to its powers under chapter VII. This is an express exception to the
reservation found in U.N. Charter, art. 2(7). Should the action by the Security Council be
frustrated by the veto, however, the Assembly may wish to act in pursuance to the Resolution
"Uniting for Peace,'' GENERAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL RBcoRDs, 5th sess., Supp. No. 20, p. 10
(1950). Since the express exception of art. 2(7) applies only to the Security Council,
difficulties confront the Assembly in the domestic civil war situation. If all the advances
against domestic jurisdiction are written off as a limitation of "intervention," the Assembly
is "still incompetent to deal forcibly under "Uniting for Peace" against a civil war. The
Assembly's action would then flatly contradict the reservation of domestic matters. Hence
the problem is best solved by a construction of "essentially domestic," and a workable
solution would exempt all matters of "international concern" from the limitation. This
concept would permit the Assembly to act under the "Uniting for Peace Resolution" where
an otherwise domestic civil war poses a threat to the peace.
96 Preuss, note 83 supra, at 627 et seq. Speaking of the character of the Spanish
Government, the Report of the Security Council Subcommittee on the Spanish Question
said: "There can be no question that the situation in Spain is of international concern."
Report of the Subcommittee on the Spanish Question, SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL
RBcoRDs, 1st Year, 2d Ser. Spec. Supp. at 1 (1946). Mr. Vyshinsky: ''These [domestic
matters] are not matters which have an international character; these are not matters which
concern international relations." GENERAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL RBcoRDs (Plenary Meetings) Pt. 2, 1041, 1043 (1946). Cf. statement of Mr. Lodge to the General Committee
of the Eighth General Assembly: "The United States has observed with increasing concern
the tendency of the General Assembly to place on its agenda subjects the international
character of which is doubtful .••• The United States holds that this problem deserves
most careful consideration by all member governments in preparing for the Charter Review
Conference." RBvmw OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER (Documents) 83d Cong., 2d
sess., Doc. No. 87 at 283 (1954). But see Hearings (1954) at 56.
97 Discussion note 95 supra.
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article 2(7). One impediment to the use of progressive development
techniques is removed. The fully sovereign character of the member
states thus substantially reduced, even less support remains for a "sovereignty" based conception supporting a restrictive view of Charter
interpretation generally.98 Hence it may be concluded that interpretation and practice is an effective method for creating change in a
legal structure such as the Charter. Already the veto and domestic
jurisdiction limitations are substantially reduced. These developments
made possible in security and other areas of intense political interest,
then surely the remaining impediments to forceful action in the United
Nations may be removed by the same method.
Difficulties nevertheless remain. The concept of development by
interpretation and practice may raise questions associated with the
customary law of nations. As customary international law suffers from
an inability to effect rapid change in the context of a clear tradition of
customary law and the inability to erect new organizational forms, so
these objections may be raised against development of the United Nations through practice. For example, the International Court of Justice
has upheld the veto power on applications for membership.99 The
Court has missed an opportunity to extend its compulsory jurisdiction
by dicta suggesting the Court would refuse to take jurisdiction when
the only evidence of consent consists of a Security Council resolution
recommending that the parties submit their dispute to the Court.100
These rules being supported more or less by practice and judicial decision, it may be doubted that they can be overcome through interpretation and practice. The second objection goes to the possibility of
erecting a new structure by interpretation. How, for example, can
98 Notes 57, 59 supra.
99 Competence of the

General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United
Nations, I.C.J. Rep. 4 (1950).
lOO Corfu Channel Case (Preliminary Objection), I.C.J. Rep. 15 at 26 (1947-1948).
The Court's jurisdiction rests upon consent of litigants. Statute of the International Court
of Justice, art. 36. It may be expressed, however, in various ways. For a collection of
materials bearing on the consent requirement to the World Court's jurisdiction in contentious cases see HAMI!no, THE CASE LAw OF THE lNrBRNATIONAL CotmT 321 et seq.
(1952); HunsoN, THE PERMANENT CotmT OF lNrBRNATIONAL JusncE 405-482 (1942);
LisSITZYN, THE lNr.ERNATIONAL CotmT OF JusncE 61-71 (1951). In the Corfu Channel
Case, supra, the Court took jurisdiction on other evidence of consent but did not consider
the Security Council Resolution recommending to the Albanian government and the United
Kingdom that they refer the case to the Court. Despite the provision of art. 36(1) that
"the jurisdiction of the Court comprises • • • all matters specially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations," a concurring minority held that acceptance of the Charter
by the members did not express their consent for the Council to make a binding recommendation vesting jurisdiction in the Court. Cf. U.N. Charter, art. 36(1, 3); Corfu
Channel Case (Preliminary Objection), at 31; Hudson, "The Twenty-Sixth Year of the
World Court," 42 AM. J. INT. L. 1 (1948).
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practice and custom create an International Criminal Court? Institutions like courts do not ordinarily appear without an organic instrument. How then could the gradual method of interpretation meet the
need for the creation of new institutions ab initio? How can effective
restraints and safeguards be placed against the institutions like the
proposed International Criminal Court?
Both central objections to the process of development by interpretation and practice ignore the character of basic institutions already
established under the Charter. The World Court, Security Council,
and General Assembly are already working institutions. Through development and application, these established iµstitutions, particularly
the General Assembly, could provide adequate solutions to the problems of overcoming existing practice and erecting new institutions.
Accordingly, the Assembly could revise the jurisdiction requirements
of the World Court1°1 and undertake to admit new members to the
organization without a favorable recommendation of the Security
Council.102 Similarly, the proposed criminal court could be established
by resolution of the Assembly without unanimous consent of the
members. 103 Indeed the views of the American member of the Special
Committee charged with drafting a statute for such a court suggested
General Assembly action as part of a plan for implementing the proposed statute.104 Should the Assembly adopt this procedure for creating
new institutions, adequate safeguards and limitations may be worked
into the proposal and implementing resolutions.105 Hence an increased
emphasis upon the powers of the Assembly suggests the general direction for development making possible the changes necessary to success101 U.N. Charter, arts. IO, 13. Cf. generally Sloan, ''The Binding Force of a 'Recommendation' of the General Assembly of -the United Nations," 25 BruT. Y.B. !Nr. L. 1
(1948).
102 See dissenting opinions of Judges Alvarez and Azevedo, Competence of the General
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, I.C.J. Rep. 12, 22 (1950);
statement of Mr. Vieyra, Argentine representative, in the Ad Hoc Political Committee on
the Admission of New Members (mimeograph, 1953).
103 Legal arguments going to the Assembly's competence to establish an independent
judicial body are discussed in ''International Criminal Jurisdiction," 15 U.N. BUL. 193
(1953); Liang, ''The Establishment of an International Criminal Jurisdiction: The Second
Phase," 47 AM. J. !Nr. L. 638 (1953); Wright, "Proposal for an International Criminal
Court," 46 AM. J. INT. L. 60 (1952); Liang, ''Establishment of an International Criminal
Jurisdiction: First Phase," id. at 73.
·
104 ''International Criminal Jurisdiction," 15 U.N. BUL. 193 (1953).
105 Safeguards are of course provided in the Revised Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Court, adopted by the 1953 Special Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, id. at 196. Cf. Finch, ''Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court," 46 AM.
J. !Nr. L. 89 (1952).
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ful realization of the purposes of the United Nations.106 In the event
the General Assembly's functions thus find emphasis and application,
difficulties associated with customary international law raise no wholesale inhibitions to further growth through interpretation and practice.
It is pot therefore unreasonable to posit the gradual technique of
interpretation and practice as the preferable legal basis for effective
change. That method is shown to be more than a mere concept; it is
a working tool of international life. It has reformulated and limited
drastically the practical effect of the veto; it has confined if not destroyed
the jurisdictional limits of domestic matters. Its use within the context
of existing institutions of the United Nations evidences a utility beyond
that associated with customary growth in the law of nations generally.
Legal difficulties accordingly fail to emerge as effective inhibitions to
the process of progressive development by interpretation and practice.
While progressive development has limitations, these are political
rather than legal in character. Assuming that the legal difficulties
discussed above may be readily overcome, the remaining obstacle to
efficient change is essentially a political matter. Asking what the community desires in terms of change and growth, the political limitations
are altogether proper. They would and should limit change by any
other device as well as progressive development. The problem thus
reduced to politics, the burden of change shifts to the political community. If the community's desires and needs cannot be effected within
the formal structure of the existing organization, then development of
the sense of community, not formal amendment of the Charter is
106This may require less emphasis upon recourse to the World Court for advisory
opinions on matters of competence. Since the legal question of competence is so thoroughly
political in inception and consequence, the process of decision by the political organ immediately concerned may be preferable. Thus Mr. Vyshinsky, speaking to the domestic
jurisdiction issue in the African Human Rights dispute before the General Assembly said:
"The Soviet delegation considers that justice must indeed be secured and it should be secured
by an international court; but this international court is here, it is yourselves, it is all of us,
it is our Organization which should deliver its verdict. This is what we want, this is what
we demand." GENERAL Assl!MBLY OFFICIAL REcoRDs (Plenary Meetings) Pt. 2, 1041, 1045
(1946). This was apparently the view of the framers. "In the course of the operations
from day to day of the various organs of the Organization, it is inevitable that each organ
will interpret such parts of the Charter as are applicable to its particular functions. This
process is inherent in the functioning of any body which operates under an instrument defining its functions and powers." Report of Committee IV/2, 13 U.N. Con£. Doc. 703 at
709 (1945). See panel discussion, "Strengthening the United Nations," Pnocl!l!DINGS OP
nm AMERICAN SocmTY oP OOERNATIONAL LA.w 141, 164 (1950). Cf. id. at 158-159.
For a different side of this problem see Gross, "States as Organs of International Law and the
Problem of Autointerpretation" in LA.w AND PoLl'I'lcs IN nm WoRLD CoMMUNITY, Lipsky
ed., 59 (1953). Compare Kunz, "The United Nations and the Rule of Law," 46 AM. J.
!Nr. L. 504 (1952); Eagleton, "The United Nations: A Legal Order?" in LA.w AND PoLl'I'ICS
IN nm WoRLD COMMUNITY, Lipsky ed., 129 (1953); Cowles, "Revision of the United
Nations Charter and the Development of Law," 33 NEB. L. REv. 35 (1953).
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required. To argue formal amendment in this context is to assume a
revolutionary change in the attitudinal and political structure of the
world community, an assumption at best utopian, at worst divisive and
destructive. If the community is prepared to revise the basic organization for control of international life, this need not be attempted through
formal amendment of the Charter; it can be properly and promptly
effected through progressive development of the existing structure.

V. Legal Techniques and Policy Goals as Interrelated
Problems in Charter Revision
These concluding observations assume that change is both necessary and resolutely desired by a preponderant majority of United Nations members. The substance of specific change is ordinarily left to
determination through the international political process. Legal method
has as its task the delimitation of techniques available for implementing
specific proposals for change. Yet policy and method combine to present a galaxy of mixed problems of interaction between law and politics. Each has its unavoidable and material effect upon the other.
Therefore, it may be assumed that, change being desired, the ultimate
choice of technique involves a balancing of specific means, a weighing
of advantages against disadvantages to the whole scheme of possible
developments under consideration. Thus any treatment of goals without reference to legal means leaves one material part of the problem of
change unsolved.
Revolutionary techniques survive analysis as legally possible but
politically improbable methods. Rebus sic stantibus and the doctrine
of prior breach seem to argue too much. Like the notion of withdrawal
from the United Nations, these drastic devices require destructiop of
the whole concept of world organization in order to achieve even limited and modest change. As unrealistic possibilities, they may be
accordingly excluded from further consideration. .
If the extremes of renunciation are to be avoided, so must the competing extreme method of revolutionary displacement. While this
device remains equally available as a legal possibility, there is little
evidence that favorable opinion sufficient to warrant a drastic increase
in the function of world organization exists. To emphasize the need
for such revolutionary extensions of organizational structures implicit
in Atlantic Union or World Federation serves only to divert attention
from the less dramatic but more meaningful possibilities for modest
change within the existing United Nations framework.
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If organizational change is to be effected through the international
political process, moreover, it may be urged that revision by the technique of formal amendment be approached cautiously if not entirely
avoided. 107 While it may be contended that change by subordinate
agreement remains a possibility worthy of considerable exploration,
proposals for formal amendment tend to inhibit the process of change
by interpretation and political accommodation.108 Since the formal
amendment process seems doomed to frustration at the outset, it remains
to examine the interrelations of amendment and practice.
One of the principal difficulties inherent in the amendment process
centers upon the admissions it may imply. To propose a drastic amendment· is to admit that its substance is presently unlawful under the
Charter or general international law. Otherwise, it could be argued,
the amendment would not be necessary or desirable. To propose, for
example, that the veto be removed from pacific settlement or membership matters is to admit that the veto power presently applies to those
matters. Such admissions, it is submitted, serve only to increase the
impediments to progressive development. If such far-reaching amendments fail of ratification, a clear certainty at this juncture, then the net
result of pressing for amendment is negative from the standpoint of
development along the lines proposed in the amendments.
If the amendment process is thus self-defeating from the legal progressive development standpoint, it tends also to inhibit the process of
gradual political adjustment. For the West to urge its proposals upon
the organization will require the USSR to select one of several alternative policies. Since the Soviet intransigence with respect to amendment matters is a known factor, it may be assumed that the USSR will
not acquiesce in farreaching proposals offered by the West. If the
USSR is embarrassed and isolated by amendment proposals, it might
in tum offer amendments to embarrass the West. Choosing to avoid
these possibilities, Soviet policy could totally ignore the amendment
activity or initiate a further withdrawal from international cooperation.
In any case the likelihood of intensified political disunity is clear.
Failing of ultimate ratification, the amendments would doubtless serve
107 See Gross, "Revising the Charter," 32 FonmcN AFFAIRS 203 (Jan. 1954). The
possibility that Charter review and amendment would endanger the organization's structure
as it presently exists was recognized by Secretary Dulles, Hearings (1954) at 6, 9, and
Ambassador Lodge, id. at 37.
108 But Secretary Dulles thought, " ••• it may be found practical to solidify practices
which involve effective working of the charter which will overcome many of the defects
which are now found in it, from an operating standpoint." Hearings (1954) at 10. The
contrary view is discussed in Morgenthau, "The New United Nations and the Revision of
the Charter," 16 REvmw OF PoLrTics 3 at 16 (1954).
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merely to increase international tensions and decrease the areas of
effective international communication. To the extent these results
impair gradual adjustments in the east-west conHict, the amendment
process would again appear self-defeating.
Seri_ous thought about developing the United Nations ought thus
to consider the problem as one much broader than mere formal amendment. Caution may be necessary where the veto is expected. In other
areas, where prior agreement with the Soviet Union may be reached,
caution based on these assumptions may be unnecessary. Yet the veto
danger areas seem to call for a reticent approach to revision by amendment. If reticence enlarges the future possibility of progressive development and political adjustment, protection of those interests should
outweigh the dramatic advantages of the amendment process. From
the standpoint of United Nations interests, enthusiasm resulting from
an amendment campaign may not favorably balance the divisive results
in the sphere of gradual political adjustment and organizational growth.
Since the gradual approach rests upon the extensive and unexhausted
capacity of the organization to adjust itself to gradual changes in the
community, it should not be hastily threatened by the pursuit of impossible but attractive formal amendments. As the world community
gradually seeks a system of order by extending its organizational structure· through practice, drastic methods might be avoided if the United
Nations is to absorb the community's growth and function as an acceptable regulator of international politics.

